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Abstract. The Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OS-
STMM) provides a “scientific methodology for the accurate characteriza-
tion of operational security” [Her10, p.13]. It is extensively referenced in
writings aimed at security testing professionals such as textbooks, stan-
dards and academic papers. In this work we offer a fundamental critique
of OSSTMM and argue that it fails to deliver on its promise of actual
security. Our contribution is threefold and builds on a textual critique of
this methodology. First, OSSTMM’s central principle is that security can
be understood as a quantity of which an entity has more or less. We show
why this is wrong and how OSSTMM’s unified security score, the rav,
is an empty abstraction. Second, OSSTMM disregards risk by replacing
it with a trust metric which confuses multiple definitions of trust and,
as a result, produces a meaningless score. Finally, OSSTMM has been
hailed for its attention to human security. Yet it understands all human
agency as a security threat that needs to be constantly monitored and
controlled. Thus, we argue that OSSTMM is neither fit for purpose nor
can it be salvaged, and it should be abandoned by security professionals.
1 Introduction
Penetration testing textbooks advise their readers to follow a pre-established
methodology. For example, Johansen et al. write: “A penetration testing method-
ology defines a roadmap, with practical ideas and proven practices that can be
followed to assess the true security posture of a network, application, system, or
any combination thereof” [JAHA16]. Similarly, Duffy notes: “The biggest bene-
fit of using a methodology is that it allows assessors to evaluate an environment
holistically and consistently” and “when standard exploits do not work, testers
can have tunnel vision; sticking to a methodology will prevent that” [Duf15, pp.5-
6]. Penetration testing methodologies are therefore seen to enable a systematic
assessment of an organisation’s security.
However, the use of a penetration testing methodology contains within it a
tension. On the one hand, it ought to provide a complete coverage of the target,
thus enabling a better understanding of its security; deciding on a methodology
before engagement should enable a better understanding of the object after-
wards. On the other hand, fixing the steps and tests performed to understand
the security of a target before engaging with it, may subvert the understanding
of it. The methodology may simply not be adequate for the object under consid-
eration. For example, if a methodology does not cover IPv6, attack vectors via
IPv6 will be missed unless the tester deviates from the methodology under their
own initiative. Similarly, vulnerabilities involving, say, SCTP traffic are unlikely
to be captured, since methodologies typically focus on TCP and UDP.
This tension is, for example, identified by Wilhelm when he writes: “What
we need in our industry is a repeatable process that allows for verifiable findings,
but which also allows for a high degree of flexibility on the part of the pentest
analyst to perform ‘outside-the-box’ attacks and inquiries against the target
systems and networks” [Wil13, p.76]. Similarly, Stuttard and Pinto emphasise:
“Following all the steps in this methodology will not guarantee that you discover
all the vulnerabilities within a given application. However, it will provide you
with a good level of assurance that you have probed all the necessary regions of
the application’s attack surface and have found as many issues as possible given
the resources available to you” [SP11].
This tension does not invalidate the utility of penetration testing method-
ologies in many scenarios as the tested objects tend to exhibit a large level of
similarity, permitting presumptions to be made about the objects under con-
sideration. It does, however, caution against claims of actual security, i.e. a full
understanding of the object under consideration, when the object was not, in
fact, studied in its own right but through the lens of a predecided methodology.
The standardised nature of such methodologies also questions their ability to
yield reliable results about an organisation’s total security posture.
Significantly, however, this limitation of penetration testing methodologies
is not necessarily acknowledged by the methodologies themselves. In particular,
the Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM), which we
consider in this work, promises an accurate understanding of security – what
it terms “Actual Security” – as the result of the application of its scientific
methodology:
The primary purpose of this manual is to provide a scientific method-
ology for the accurate characterization of operational security (OpSec)
through examination and correlation of test results in a consistent and
reliable way. [Her10, Introduction, p.13]
OSSTMM. The methodology was first introduced in 2000. The current ver-
sion is 3.0 and was released in 2010 by the Institute for Security and Open
Methodologies (ISECOM). There is also a draft version 4.0, but it seems to be
hardly considered, plausibly due to the fact that it is only available to ISECOM
members.
OSSTMM is structured similarly to other security testing methodologies. It
introduces its basic premises, notions and processes in chapters one to six. This is
followed by five chapters on particular areas, each discussing concrete tests. The
methodology finishes with pointers on compliance, reporting, expected outcomes
and the licence. OSSTMM opens its Introduction with:
The Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM)
provides a methodology for a thorough security test, herein referred to as
an OSSTMM audit. An OSSTMM audit is an accurate measurement of
security at an operational level that is void of assumptions and anecdotal
evidence. [Her10, Introduction, p.11, emphasis added]
With this, the authors announce OSSTMM’s two out of three core contri-
butions to security testing which distinguish it from other methodologies: its
security metrics (Chapter 4) and its trust analysis (Chapter 5).
First, OSSTMM defines a unified security score – the rav – to be measured
which ought to express the deviation from perfect security:
The rav is a scale measurement of an attack surface, the amount of
uncontrolled interactions with a target, which is calculated by the quan-
titative balance between porosity, limitations, and controls. In this scale,
100 rav (also sometimes shown as 100% rav) is perfect balance and any-
thing less is too few controls and therefore a greater attack surface. More
than 100 rav shows more controls than are necessary which itself may
be a problem as controls often add interactions within a scope as well as
complexity and maintenance issues. [Her10, Ch.1, p.22]
Second, for the avoidance of bias and reliance on assumptions, OSSTMM
defines security independent of risk, the environment and threats:
However, to remove bias from security metrics and provide a more fair
assessment we removed the use of risk. Risk itself is heavily biased and
often highly variable depending on the environment, assets, threats, and
many more factors. [Her10, Ch.1, p.28]
To avoid the pitfalls it associates with risk, OSSTMM proposes quantifiable, fact
based trust metrics:
Our intention is to eventually eliminate the use of risk in areas of security
which have no set price value of an asset (like with people, personal
privacy, and even fluctuating markets) in favor of trust metrics which
are based completely on facts. [Her10, Instructions, p.2]
The third major contribution of OSSTMM is its “holistic” [Her10, Ch.4, p.68]
approach to security. That is, OSSTMM applies this metric and its methodology
to a comprehensive variety of areas, including, and in contrast to other such
methodologies, to Human Security (Chapter 7):
This is a methodology to test the operational security of physical lo-
cations, human interactions, and all forms of communications such as
wireless, wired, analog, and digital. [Her10, Instructions, p.2]
This contribution is often highlighted in the literature, in e.g. [PR10] OS-
STMM is recognised for being the first methodology “to include human factors
in the tests, taking into account the established fact that humans may be very
dangerous for the system”.1
1 The seminal work criticising this notion is [AS99], see Section 5.1.
OSSTMM’s Impact. ISECOM offers various certifications for security pro-
fessionals, such as OPST (OSSTMM Professional Security Tester), OPSE (OS-
STMM Professional Security Expert) and CTA (Certified Trust Analyst), and
for organisations, infrastructure and products, such as STAR (Security Test Au-
dit Report) and the OSSTMM Seal of Approval. Furthermore, ISECOM has
several related projects that build on OSSTMM, such as SCARE (Source Code
Analysis Risk Evaluation) which applies the rav to source code analysis, HSM
(Home Security Methodology and Vacation Guide) which applies the rav to se-
curing a home, HHS (Hacker Highschool) which teaches security awareness to
teenagers based on OSSTMM, and BPP (The Bad People Project) which is a
security and safety awareness programme for children and parents based on OS-
STMM’s rav and trust metrics. These projects further emphasise the centrality
of the rav, trust and human interactions, i.e. the aspects of OSSTMM focused
on in this work, to the ISECOM mission.
Beyond these affiliated projects, it is difficult to assess how widely OSSTMM
is used. However, in a 2015 survey [KBM15], 10 out of 32 penetration testing
providers cite OSSTMM as an influence for their own methodology.2 Further-
more, CREST’s A guide for running an effective Penetration Testing programme
refers to OSSTMM as an authoritative source for a “standard penetration testing
methodolog[y]” and notes its comprehensiveness [Cre17]. NIST Special Publica-
tion 800-115 calls it a “widely used assessment methodology” [SSCO08] and the
PCI Penetration Testing Guidance for the PCI Data Security Standard (PCI
DSS) lists it as one of five “industry-accepted methodologies” [Cou15]. A similar
note is struck in [Sha14]: “There are not many standards in use today for assess-
ments and pen tests: PTES, OSSTMM, etc.”3; in [HHM+14] Holik et al. refer
to OSSTMM as “heavily reputable in penetration testers community”;in [PR10]
Prandini and Ramilli go further and refer to OSSTMM as “the de-facto standard
for security testers” and in [FML+14] the authors refer to it as one of “the two
most important standards in cyber-security”. OSSTMM is referenced in many
textbooks on penetration testing, e.g. [Wil13, Off14, Duf15, JAHA16, McP17],
is the methodology of choice in “Hacking Exposed Linux” [ISE08], and is used
in [Sch09] for Information Assurance testing and certification by the US De-
fense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Several academic works reference and
build on OSSTMM, e.g. [CZCG05, CCZC05, FMP+15, dJ16, CK16, TFS+18].
Overall, OSSTMM has more than 150 citations according to Google Scholar as
of Summer 2020.
Contributions. In this work, we investigate if the Open Source Security Testing
Methodology Manual delivers on what it promises with a particular focus on its
main contributions. As a consequence, we offer a fundamental critique of this
2 For context, 16 mentioned OWASP generally but only three mentioned the OWASP
testing guide, PTES was mentioned by six providers, three providers mentioned
NIST SP 800-115.
3 See Section 5.1 for a discussion of other security testing methodologies.
methodology. We do so by addressing its three main contributions, OSSTMM’s
raisons d’être, in turn.
First, OSSTMM’s central premise and promise is that security across many
areas can be understood as a quantity of which an entity has more or less.
In Section 2, we explain and demonstrate why this is incorrect and show how
OSSTMM fails to deliver on its promise of bringing security to the fore by
supplanting an understanding of its object with a method that disregards it. The
end result of this process, the rav, is a number that can be readily calculated
but conveys little about the security of the considered object.
Second, OSSTMM’s Trust definition, which is essential to the methodology
and intended to replace risk, not only shares the shortcomings of the rav, but also
collapses under its own contradictions on inspection. In particular, OSSTMM’s
attempt to identify sociological, psychological and technical notions of trust pro-
duces nonsensical claims and meaningless metrics, as we explain in Section 3.
Third, this leads us to question OSSTMM’s decision to treat all areas of
security the same in Section 4. This decision, combined with the resolve to
disregard any notion of risk or threat, leads OSSTMM to conceptualise all human
agency as a security threat. This results in a Human Security testing approach
treating all employees effectively as potential insurgents and testing procedures
that test the “requirements to incite fear, revolt, violence, and chaos” [Her10,
Ch.7, p.110].
Our critique of OSSTMM’s core components invalidates its intended function.
Overall, we find that OSSTMM imposes its abstractions against the reality they
are designed to model, producing an understanding of security that is empty
at best and outright harmful when Human Security is concerned. As such, our
conclusion is that OSSTMM’s approach to security (testing) cannot be salvaged
and the use of OSSTMM should be abandoned by practitioners. We discuss this
further and set out broader lessons in Section 5.
Method. While information security research routinely features critiques of se-
curity technologies in the form of “attack papers”, analogues of such works for
policies, frameworks and conceptions are largely absent from its core venues.
This work is a textual critique of OSSTMM based on a close reading of the
methodology and pursues two purposes. First, immediately, to show that OS-
STMM is inadequate as a security testing methodology, despite being referenced
routinely in the security testing literature. Second, more mediated, to show that
the ideas at the core of OSSTMM are wrong. As we show in Section 5, these
ideas are not OSSTMM’s privilege. It is for this reason that we chose the form
of a textual critique over alternative approaches such as empirical studies to the
effectiveness of OSSTMM in practice.
2 The Rav
The central concept in OSSTMM is its security score – the rav – as illustrated
by ISECOM’s “OSSTMM Seal of Approval”:
This seal defines an operational state of security, safety, trust, and pri-
vacy. The successfully evaluated products, services, and processes carry
their visible certification seal and rav score. This allows a purchaser to
see precisely the amount and type of change in security that the evalu-
ated solutions present. It removes the guesswork from procurement and
allows one to find and compare alternative solutions. [Her10, Introduc-
tion, p.16]
2.1 Health Analogy
OSSTMM illustrates its approach with an analogy to health in its chapter on
Operational Security Metrics. Since this analogy provides a succinct summary,
we also start there.
Imagine a machine exists that can audit all the cells in a human body.
This machine works by monitoring the cells in their environment and
even prodding each cell in a way it can react to better categorize its pur-
pose. We could then see what various cells do and how they contribute to
the overall make-up of the human body. Some cells make up tissue walls
like skin cells do. Some, like white blood cells, provide authentication and
attack other cells which are on its “bad” list. Then some cells are for-
eigners, like bacteria which have entered at some point and thrived. The
machine would classify all the cells that make up the person, a defined
scope, rather than say which are “bad” or “good”. [Her10, Ch.4, p.64]
The starting point of the thought experiment is the ability to audit every cell
in a human body. While the analogy appeals to an atomic view of health – cells
– initially the audit is not atomic. That is, the hypothetical machine observes
cells “in their environment” as part of the human body. Yet, this perspective is
immediately abandoned:
By counting the cells the machine can tell mostly how well the person
as an organism works (health) and how well they fit into their current
environment. It can also determine which cells are broken, which are
superfluous, and of which type more might be required for the person
to be more efficient, prepared for the unexpected, or for any number of
specific requirements. Since the cells are dividing and dying all the time,
the machine must also make regular tests and chart the person’s ability
to improve or at least maintain homeostasis. [Her10, Ch.4, p.64]
OSSTMM moves from understanding cells in their environment to counting
them. This transition is premised on the fact that these different parts of the
body are all called “cells” which gives the impression that they share the same
unit and the premise that they can be added up to understand a person’s health.
Furthermore, this is premised on the idea that health is a totally ordered set.
Finally, note that OSSTMM here promises to make “the person [. . . ] more ef-
ficient [. . . ] for any number of specific requirements” by exclusively considering
the inner workings of the body without any reference to for what purpose said
person ought to be made more efficient. We shall see below that these ideas
shape OSSTMM’s consideration of security.
2.2 Introducing the Rav
Having introduced the key ideas of its security metric, OSSTMM is ready to
introduce its security score: the rav.
Unfortunately there is no such machine for counting all cells in a human
body. However it does exist for security. Analysts can count and verify
the operations of targets in a scope as if it is a super-organism. They
record its interactions and the controls surrounding those interactions.
They classify them by operation, resources, processes, and limitations.
Those numbers the Analysts generate are combined so that controls add
to operational security and limitations take away from it. Even the value
of the limitations, how badly each type of problem hurts, is also not ar-
bitrary because it’s based on the combination of security and controls
within that particular scope. So a bad problem in a protective envi-
ronment will provide less overall exposure than one in a less controlled
environment. [Her10, Ch.4, p.64]
As it does for health, OSSTMM considers security – Actual Security in OS-
STMM terms – to be one ranking in which an entity scores higher or lower, a
totally ordered set. It is, perhaps, common to say “System A is more secure than
System B because System A has Advanced Cyber Thread Analysis Blockchain
Technology™”. However, is a system with a local privilege escalation bug that
requires physical access more or less secure per se than a server vulnerable to a
Denial of Service attack from an IoT botnet? Is a person using a menstruation
app to avoid pregnancy that is running on a phone to which their partner has
access more or less secure than a server running the stable release of Debian
GNU/Linux patched four days ago? These questions make no sense. What we
mean by security depends on the object and the threats we are considering.4
OSSTMM computes its rav score from “Porosity” (also referred to as “OpSec”),
“Controls” and “Limitations”.
Porosity. To establish Actual Security, OSSTMM starts by considering the
porosity of the target, where each “pore” is either “Visibility”, “Access”, or
“Trust”. For example, a server with ports 22, 80 and 443 open, would have an
Access of three. Since porosity is always considered as a negative for security,
the minimal rav in this example would be -3 (up to some normalisation).
4 Indeed, in e.g. cryptography where quantitative statements of security are abound
in the form of advantages and computational complexities, these are always related
to specific security goals and attacker capabilities. For example, any cryptographic
textbook will distinguish between the collision resistance and preimage resistance of
a cryptographic hash function and will shy away from unifying those into one score.
The minimum rav is made by the calculation of porosity which are the
holes in the scope. The problem with security metrics is generally in the
determination of the assessors to count what they can’t possibly really
know. This problem does not exist in the rav. You get what you know
from what is there for a particular vector and you make no assumptions
surrounding what is not there. You count all that which is visible and
interactive outside of the scope and allows for unauthenticated interac-
tion between other targets in the scope. That becomes the porosity. This
porosity value makes the first of 3 parts of the final rav value. [Her10,
Ch.4, p.67]
We will return to porosity, with a focus on Trust, in Section 3. For now, note
that OSSTMM’s critique of other security metrics is that they aim to count what
they cannot possibly know. That indeed sounds like something worth avoiding.
Presumably, though, those metrics wish to include a certain bit of information
– which they nevertheless do not have – because it is relevant. Thus, there is
a dilemma: we need information which we do not have. OSSTMM resolves this
dilemma by discarding what it needs to know in order to simply count what
is known. The task – understanding the security of the object at hand – is
replaced by a counting method whose appeal is merely that it is feasible. It
is one thing to give an account of what you know, it is another thing entirely
to claim that whatever you are able to observe from your vantage point is the
correct understanding of the object, when you know it is not.
Controls. Next, OSSTMM identifies control classes, all of which are always
to be acknowledged in all domains, or “channels”, that OSSTMM considers:
Human, Physical, Wireless, Telecommunications, and Data Network Security.
Thus, from the perspective of OSSTMM, these different domains share a high
level of similarity. Here, the argument relies on homographs. We illustrate this
using the control class “Integrity”:
Count each instance for Access or Trust in the scope which can assure
that the interaction process and Access to assets has finality and cannot
be corrupted, stopped, continued, redirected, or reversed without it be-
ing known to the parties involved. Integrity is a change control process.
In COMSEC data networks, encryption or a file hash can provide the
Integrity control over the change of the file in transit.5 In HUMSEC,
segregation of duties and other corruption-reduction mechanisms pro-
vide Integrity control. Assuring integrity in personnel requires that two
or more people are required for a single process to assure oversight of
5 It is worth noting that neither cryptographic mechanism described here provides
integrity protection: for example, CBC mode encryption and textbook RSA are
famously malleable, e.g. [AP13, Ble98], and hash functions are public functions op-
erating on public data so an adversary can simply recompute the hash after message
modification. The authors should have recommended a message authentication code
or a digital signature.
that process. This includes that no master Access to the whole process
exists. There can be no person with full access and no master key to all
doors. [Her10, Ch.4, p.70]
The COMSEC example in the above quote refers to the integrity of messages,
i.e. the prevention of message modification by someone other than the sender.
The recommended controls are intended to ensure that whatever message the
sender intended to send is indeed received. The HUMSEC example, however,
is concerned with distrust in the sender. It recommends “corruption-reduction
mechanisms” to hedge against the originators of actions. Thus, the two controls
are aimed at different threats: the first aims to ensure an honest actor’s messages
are not corrupted in flight, the second aims to ensure an actor itself is not cor-
rupt.6 The only relation is that the words “integrity” and “corruption” are used
in both cases. We see that the identification is merely facilitated by their iden-
tical linguistic features and not by their distinct meanings. The control classes
identified by OSSTMM are anything but self-evident. Yet, OSSTMM does not
justify them.
Overall OSSTMM defines ten such control classes – “authentication”, “in-
demnification”, “subjugation”, “continuity”, “resilience”, “non-repudiation”, “con-
fidentiality”, “privacy”, “integrity”, and “alarm” [Her10, p.72-75]. The controls
from all the classes are then added up with weights 1/10 for each class.
The next part is to account for the controls in place per target. This
means going target by target and determining where any of the 10 con-
trols are in place such as Authentication, Subjugation, Non-repudiation,
etc. Each control is valued as 10% of a pore since each provides 1/10th
of the total controls needed to prevent all attack types. This is because
having all 10 controls for each pore is functionally the same as closing
the pore provided the controls have no limitations. [Her10, Ch.4, p.67]
For example,7 two such controls would be “log file is in place” and “authen-
tication is required” and we would obtain
1/10× “log file is in place” + 1/10× “authentication is required”.
At this point, the reader may think of the above expression as a formulaic way
of saying “one log file is in place and authentication is required”. However,
as OSSTMM explains above, this is meant to be a weighted sum where each
summand is “valued” at 1/10, i.e. as far as OSSTMM is concerned, the sum of
a log file and “authentication required” is meaningful in a mathematical sense.
This reasoning presumes that all controls are the same in some quantifiable way.
The authors of OSSTMM explain:
6 An analogous cryptographic control would be the use of secret sharing and secure
multiparty computation techniques.
7 We give a full worked example of a rav calculation in Appendix A.
It is difficult to work with relative or inconsistent measurements like
choosing a specific hue of yellow to paint a room, starting work at sunrise,
having the right flavor of strawberry for a milkshake, or preparing for
the next threat to affect your organization’s profits because the factors
have many variables which are biased or frequently changing between
people, regions, customs, and locations. For this reason, many professions
attempt to standardize such things like flavors, colors, and work hours.
This is done through reductionism, a process of finding the elements
of such things and building them up from there by quantifying those
elements. This way, colors become frequencies, work hours become hours
and minutes, flavors become chemical compounds, and an attack surface
becomes porosity, controls, and limitations. The only real problem with
operational metrics is the requirement for knowing how to properly apply
the metric for it to be useful. [Her10, Ch.4, p.62]
OSSTMM claims to have identified “the elements” of a log file and the re-
quirement for authentication. However, while e.g. adding up the frequencies of
colours indeed produces a new colour (frequency), i.e. colours have a quantita-
tive side to them that permits addition, this does not hold true for log files and
authentication requirements.
One log file and one authentication requirement is not the same as one log
file and a message authentication code; log files, message authentication codes
and (user) authentication requirements are different and protect against different
threats. Thus, there are no inherent weights when adding these things that are
not reducible to the same dimension.
Even assuming that “having all 10 controls for each pore is functionally the
same as closing the pore provided the controls have no limitations”, this does
not imply adding up (a subset of) ten controls to obtain a score since each of
the specific controls needs to be in place. OSSTMM’s appeal to the diversity of
the controls does not produce the posited identity. Rather, the sentence merely
implies that the ten classes should sum to one (or whatever stands in for “all
good”) when they are all in place. The weights are irrelevant when all control
classes are in place since they are designed to sum to one in this case, but matter
for when a particular control class is missing, i.e. they are meant to encode
the importance attributed to this particular lack. This, in turn, will depend on
what is being protected and the nature of the threat under consideration. It is
not at all clear that adding an authentication requirement closes a pore to the
same extent as adding a log file documenting access after the fact does. The
choice 1/10 “authentication required” and 1/10 “log file” is as much a choice as
√
2π/e “authentication required” and 1/10 “log file”. OSSTMM is not “void of
assumptions” [Her10, Introduction, p.11].
Limitations. To complete the rav, limitations are considered:
The third part of the rav is accounting for the limitations found in the
protection and the controls. These are also known as “vulnerabilities”.
The value of these limitations comes from the porosity and established
controls themselves. [Her10, Ch.4, p.67]
To make this concrete, too, we may think of this operation of adding up
several “buffer overflows” with, say, one “CR/LF escape”.
Sums. With all components in place, the rav can be calculated.
With all counts completed, the rav is basically subtracting porosity and
limitations from the controls. This is most easily done with the rav
spreadsheet calculator. [Her10, Ch.4, p.67]
Thus, OSSTMM goes beyond the idea of security as a ranking and consid-
ers security to possess an additive structure.8 Enabling encryption “adds to”
security, having a telnet port open permitting root login “takes away” security.9
Mathematics also speaks of “adding” and “taking away”, when referring to ad-
dition and subtraction over, say, the Integers, and thus, so OSSTMM’s leap, we
shall add and subtract open ports and authentication:
c0 × log file + c1 × auth.− c2 × open port− c3 × buf. overfl.,
where ci are some weights.
10 These sums can further be extended to not only
cover the moments of an IT system but across all areas considered by OSSTMM:
One important requirement in applying the rav is that Actual Security
can only be calculated per scope. A change in channel, vector, or in-
dex is a new scope and a new calculation for Actual Security. However,
once calculated, multiple scopes can be combined together in aggregate
to create one Actual Security that represents a fuller vision of the op-
erational security [of] all scopes. For example, a test can be made of
Internet-facing servers from both the Internet side and from within the
perimeter network where the servers reside. That is 2 vectors. Assume
that, the Internet vector is indexed by IP address and contains 50 tar-
gets. The intranet vector is indexed by MAC address and is made of 100
targets because less controls exist internally to allow for more collabo-
rative interaction between systems. Once each test is completed and the
rav is counted they can be combined into one calculation of 150 targets
as well as the sums of each limitations and controls. This will give a
8 These are not equivalent. The letters in the alphabet are ordered but this does
not endow them with an addition rule. The integers modulo some prime p have an
addition (multiplication, division) rule but do not possess a natural ordering.
9 “Those numbers the Analysts generate are combined so that controls add to opera-
tional security and limitations take away from it” [Her10, Ch.4, p.64]
10 These weights are not always constants. In particular, limitations are weighted ac-
cording to their class and porosity. Thus, the actual expression is more complex than
given here for illustration purposes.
final Actual Security metric which is more complete for that perimeter
network than either test would provide alone. It would also be possible
to add the analysis from physical security, wireless, telecommunications,
and human security tests in the same way. Such combinations are pos-
sible to create a better understanding of the total security in a holistic
way. [Her10, Ch.4, p.68]
In other words, OSSTMM not only adds and subtracts ports and log files
but also doors (Physical Security), “whispering or using hand signals” [Her10,
Ch4., p.74] or “a cultural bias” [Her10, Ch.4, p.76] (Human Security). The com-
putation continues for a few more steps to produce the final rav value (see
Appendix A for a more detailed example). However, already at this stage this
score is an arbitrary choice produced by eradicating the differences between the
features considered in order to combine them using some chosen weights. As its
opening gambit OSSTMM promises the reader the avoidance of “general best
practices, anecdotal evidence, or superstitions” [Her10, p.1], but the answer OS-
STMM gives as to the “Actual Security” of the studied object is vacuous and is
based on category mistakes and unsubstantiated choices.
Remark 1. While it is possible to construct examples where an OSSTMM score
contradicts an expert’s verdict on security, since e.g. all controls are weighted
the same, being vacuous does not mean that the score must commonly and strik-
ingly disagree with the reality it subsumes. Consider the following hypothetical
example: if the rav score for, say, an unpatched Windows 7 system exposing SMB
on the Internet were to be lower than for, say, an up-to-date copy of OpenBSD
in the default configuration, no one would question the security of the latter
in favour of the former. Rather, if this was the case, the rav would change. In
contrast, if we were to rethink the security of a patched OpenBSD and an un-
patched Windows 7, it would be because we had learned something new about
these systems. Echoing Kay [Kay09], the rav tells us nothing that we have not
previously told the rav. It does, however, obscure what we tell it. The rav score
itself is not useful to an engineer tasked with improving it: the engineer would
have to return to the data that was used to compute it to understand which se-
curity controls were missing and where. The sentence “telnet is open” contains
more information than whatever numerical value OSSTMM assigns to it.
3 Trust
As mentioned above, in OSSTMM terms, Access, Visibility and Trust make up
Porosity (also referred to as OpSec), and security is defined as the separation
of a threat and an asset. While Access is roughly what you would expect –
the ability to interact with the asset – Visibility is “a means of calculating
opportunity” [Her10, Introduction, p.23]. From this perspective, an asset needs
to be visible to be targeted.
For OSSTMM, Trust is a core component of security testing and, unlike
e.g. Access and Visibility, requires its own separate analysis, which is why OS-
STMM dedicates the whole of Chapter 5 to it. This attention to Trust is chiefly
motivated by ISECOM’s ambition to replace considerations of risk with trust
metrics, as discussed in our introduction. Thus, examining Trust in OSSTMM
is examining one of its key tenets. The centrality of this notion to ISECOM’s
mission is underlined by ISECOM offering certification specifically for its Trust
analysis:
The Certified Trust Analyst proves a candidate has the skills and knowl-
edge to efficiently evaluate the trust properties11 of any person, place,
thing, system, or process and make accurate and efficient trust deci-
sions. [Her10, Introduction, p.15]
Whether applied to a person, an object or a process, Trust has a numerical
value – zero or more Trusts – that determines “Trust”, the unit of analysis.
3.1 What Trust?
In what follows, we use “Trust” to denote the concept of trust as defined in
OSSTMM and “trust” for its wider conceptions, such as the diverging notions
of trust in computer science and the social sciences, as outlined in our discussion
of related work in Section 5.1. Critically, this distinction and the plurality of
trust definitions are not recognised by OSSTMM. Rather, in order for its trust
analysis to capture what it needs it to capture, OSSTMM collapses multiple
trust definitions, making its understanding and application of trust nonsensical.
While OSSTMM maintains that “people [. . . ] misuse trust as a concept” [Her10,
Ch.5, p.87], we show how this statement directly applies to OSSTMM. We iden-
tify and discuss this below by showing how OSSTMM needs to appeal to under-
standings of trust within computer science as well as sociological and behavioural
notions of trust in order to facilitate its trust analysis.
Computer Science. The Trust unit in OSSTMM is better understood as mod-
elling the need to trust. Trust is always measured as a negative in OSSTMM,
a person with a Trust score of five, for example, is understood to be a riskier
proposition than someone with a Trust/need-to-trust score of, say, two (the same
goes for any other object):
Where security is like a wall that separates threats from assets, trust is
a hole in that wall. [Her10, Ch.5, p.87]
Trust in OSSTMM terms is couched in an understanding of trust as a risk
of exploitation and as a vulnerability. This notion of trust is not necessarily
controversial from a computer science perspective. For example, this mirrors the
notion of trust in cryptography where constructions not relying on a trusted
third party are considered preferable to ones that do. Indeed, cryptographic
protocols can be characterised as emulating a trusted third party by mutually
distrustful parties.12
11 We discuss OSSTMM’s ten trust properties in Section 3.2.
12 As Goldreich writes: “A general framework for casting (m-party) cryptographic (pro-
tocol) problems consists of specifying a random process that maps m inputs to m
Sociological. More specifically, OSSTMM defines Trust as Internal Access.
In operational security, Trust is merely a contributor to porosity, just
another interaction to control. It differs from Access (the other form of
interaction), in how it relates to other targets within the scope. So where
Access is interaction between two sides of a vector into and out of the
scope, Trust is measured as the interactions between targets within the
scope. [Her10, Ch.5. p.87]
This notion of trust assumes interaction and thus relies on relations between
objects within the environment. Recalling that OSSTMM also attempts to model
Human Security, it thus models human interactions which are social in nature.
Put differently, access – internal or not – is (also) social. Thus, we observe that
OSSTMM relies on a sociological conception of trust precisely because it insists
that Trust is understood as Internal Access.
However, trust, regardless of disciplinary grounding, is fundamentally differ-
ent from access and it needs to be recognised as such.13 It is therefore not only
unhelpful to employ the two terms in similar ways, as done here by OSSTMM,
it also obfuscates both the cognitive and emotional aspects that make up trust
interactions [LW85]. Furthermore, OSSTMM’s Trust metric assumes that trust
relations do not exist outside the environment as this is simply considered as
Access by OSSTMM. Thus, why label Internal Access as Trust? If Trust is sim-
ply another form of Access, shaped by different types of interactions, why not
declare it as such?
Behavioural. On the same page, OSSTMM introduces a third definition:
Trust is a decision. While some people claim it is an emotion, like love,
or a feeling, like pain, its clearly a complex quality we humans are born
with. Unlike an emotion or a feeling, we can choose to trust or not to
trust someone or something even if it feels wrong to do so. It appears
that we are capable to rationalize in a way to supersede how we feel
about trusting a target. [Her10, Ch.5, p.87]
Here, OSSTMM posits trust as either an emotion/feeling or a decision, in
order to then reject the former in favour of the latter.14 OSSTMM is interested
outputs. The inputs to the process are to be thought of as local inputs of m parties,
and the m outputs are their corresponding (desired) local outputs. The random pro-
cess describes the desired functionality. That is, if the m parties were to trust each
other (or trust some external party), then they could each send their local input
to the trusted party, who would compute the outcome of the process and send to
each party the corresponding output. A pivotal question in the area of cryptographic
protocols is the extent to which this (imaginary) trusted party can be ‘emulated’ by
the mutually distrustful parties themselves.” [Gol04]
13 For example, the cryptographic literature would not refer to interactions, typically
modelled as oracle access, in a cryptographic protocol as “trust”.
14 We may note a category mistake in the initial dichotomy being offered: trust is a
content of thought – what we think – whereas an emotion is a form – how it appears.
in this conclusion because it wants to posit that trust is an object of reason
or rationality: trust is open to reflection.15 This is not controversial. However,
declaring trust as an atomic decision is. Since OSSTMM insists that Trust is
Internal Access, and given its appeal to Human Security, it requires a broader
understanding of trust; an understanding that acknowledges the contextual and
the “environment” in which trust interactions emerge and take form. Within
these environments, trust does not exist in isolation, in the same way that trust-
decisions are not made in a vacuum. Rather, here, trust is a key building block
of the (social) environment in which interactions take place – hence, OSSTMM’s
notion that trust is solely a choice is deceptive in this context.
This is also evident in the wider social sciences where, for example, in psycho-
logical terms, a person’s self-efficacy is critical to any understanding of how an
individual makes security decisions [Ban82]. From a sociological perspective, so-
cietal structures and interpersonal relations influence how people make security
decisions [WC03]. From an organisational perspective, workplace culture as well
as formal and informal policies influence security decisions [VNVS10, DG14].
Exemplified by these works, trust decisions, like security, are deeply interwoven
into human relations and contextual settings.
3.2 Trust Properties
Countable. However, these objections are moot when we recall that OSSTMM
simply defined Trust as Internal Access. Yet, so is OSSTMM’s discussion above:
“While some people claim internal access is an emotion, like love, or a feeling,
like pain, it is clearly a complex quality we humans are born with” makes no
sense. OSSTMM wants both: to redefine Trust as Internal Access as well as
maintaining this redefinition captures the notion of trust as a human capacity.
This confusion is meant to enable OSSTMM to make trust quantifiable for the
rav:
This means we can quantify it by applying a logical process. It also means
we can assign trust values to objects and processes as well as people based
on these values. This brings new power to those who can analyze trust
and make decisions based on that analysis. [Her10, Ch.5, p.87]
This does not mean that at all. As far as OSSTMM is concerned, to rationally
understand an object, to reason about it, means to quantify it; a leap OSSTMM
simply asserts here. This is like saying to reason about OSSTMM we should
count, say, its number of pages, words, characters, revisions and so on. Or, since
OSSTMM appeals to mathematics, this is like saying we understand the ring
Z7681[x]/(x
256 + 1) when we know it has 7681256 elements.
However, since this line of enquiry would take us away from the object at hand, we
abandon it here.
15 This is why OSSTMM can afford to contradict itself by re-admitting trust emotions
one sentence later. It is not actually invested in the either-or question but that the
former can override the latter.
Properties. To compute Trust, OSSTMM proposes ten Trust Properties [Her10,
Ch.5, p.90]. These range from seemingly calculable notions such as size and value
to more evasive ones such as symmetry and consistency:16
The Trust Properties are the quantifiable, objective elements which are
used to create trust. We can say these properties are what we would
say give us “reason to trust”.17 These properties are to be made into
baseline rules based on the target and situation which we are verifying.
During research, many potential Trust Properties were discovered which
are commonly in use and even official, government and industry regula-
tions recommend [sic.], however they failed logic tests and were discarded
from our set of properties leaving only ten. [Her10, Ch.5, p.88]
As this paragraph exemplifies, all Trust Properties identified in the method-
ology are treated as quantifiable and unbiased. However, at no point does OS-
STMM attempt to explain from where these Trust Properties have emerged –
or which properties were excluded – except that they were discovered “during
research” and either passed or failed “logic tests”. Which and whose research,
and what logic, we do not know. One could say that we are being asked to blindly
trust the methodology, which OSSTMM, ironically, tells us should be avoided.
While we might accept that a property such as size is addable and comprises
quantifiable elements, other properties hold no calculable features – claiming
that they do renders the methodology increasingly futile. To this end, let us
take a closer look at one of the Trust Properties identified by OSSTMM: consis-
tency – which is defined as the “historical evidence of compromise or corruption
of the target” [Her10, Ch.5, p.90].
Rules. In order to make this Trust Property (like all ten Trust Properties)
calculable, OSSTMM introduces Trust Rules [Her10, Ch.5, p.91]. This, it claims,
translates properties into rules through a series of questions which will produce
unbiased numbers as answers.
Using the trust properties allows us to create only quantifiable rules, not
“soft” rules that can either substantiate the trust level nor disrupt it
with a biased, emotional weight. However, the properties on their own
are useless if they cannot become quantifiable properties, objective, or
understandable by the common person not necessarily involved in the
security field. [Her10, Ch.5, p.91]
OSSTMM gives an example which concerns making better hiring decisions.
Here, humans (as the potential new hires) are the target, meaning that a series
of human qualities are assessed; framed within the ten Trust Properties and
16 The ten Trust Properties identified by OSSTMM are: Size, Symmetry, Visibility,
Subjugation, Consistency, Integrity, Offsets, Value, Components, Porosity.
17 As we shall see below, these are actually reasons not to trust, i.e. a high score in one
of the Trust Properties implies a high need to trust.
measured using the Trust Rules. Thus, let us return to the Trust Property con-
sistency to explore how OSSTMM translates this into a Trust Rule that can be
used in the hiring of new staff:
5. Consistency:
5.1. The total number of months which the applicant has not been em-
ployed divided by the total number of months the applicant has been on
the workforce and eligible for employment.
5.2. The total number of criminal offenses known divided by the current
age less eighteen years (or the legal age of an adult in your region) of
the applicant.
5.3. The number of neutral or negative references from past employers
divided by the total number of past employers.
5.4. Record the average of these results. [Her10, Ch.5, p.93]
These questions introduce several uncertainties and unknowns. For example,
calculating the number of criminal offences “known” naturally ignores poten-
tially unknown criminal offences, but more importantly, it ignores what the
offences were, when they happened and how they might influence the work of
the applicant.18 Moreover, assessing whether a reference is “neutral” or “nega-
tive” requires individual interpretation and qualitative judgement, which is not
accounted for in OSSTMM. So, while these calculations can be done – i.e. they
are feasible – and will result in a number, what this number tells us is unclear
at best. Similarly, every object of calculation is chosen to be weighted exactly
the same, one neutral reference per past employer and one criminal offence per
year are treated the same and carry the same value. Finally, why the average
number, instead of, say, the median or the max, of the answers to these questions
is equally obscure.19
In summary, in OSSTMM’s Trust Properties and Rules, the category mistake
we have encountered when discussing the rav, i.e. assigning – without justifica-
tion – quantities to qualitative data, reappears.
3.3 Risks & Threats
As discussed in the introduction, the reason OSSTMM gives for introducing its
trust metric is to avoid risk analysis, which OSSTMM maintains “speculates”
and “derives opinions” [Her10, Ch.3, p.53]:
The fundamental difference between doing a risk analysis versus a secu-
rity analysis is that in security analysis you never analyze the threat. [Her10,
Ch.5. p.53]
18 Many legal systems distinguish between criminal convictions such as felonies
and misdemeanours. Similarly, the nature of an offence is taken into ac-
count by e.g. the Solictors Regulation Authority in England and Wales
https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/handbook/suitabilitytest/part2/content.page .
19 For example, taking the computer science perspective of trust, one would expect the
max i.e. worst-case security, not average-case: one vulnerability suffices to subvert
security goals.
Threats, in any form or shape, do therefore not form part of Actual Security.
This is perhaps not surprising given OSSTMM’s sole focus on what can be
observed and the assertion that the existence, timing and direction of a threat
can only be assumed and not known.
In OSSTMM terms, then, doing away with considerations of threats allows
for the creation of “Perfect Security, the exact balance of security and controls
with operations and limitations” [Her10, Ch.1, p.20]. This invites the question
of what standard it has to judge this balance as perfect. OSSTMM posits a
balance of controls (adding security) with operations (taking away security) or
a balance of means to achieve security in light of functionality requirements,
without discussing the end that is pursued by these means, i.e. against what
security ought to be achieved. OSSTMM’s balance is not a relation between the
object and the environment but exists purely within the object by definition:
In reality, “perfect” is a subjective concept and what may not be perfect
for one person may indeed be perfect for another. Within the context
of this manual, “perfect” means a perfectly balanced equation when cal-
culating the attack surface consisting of OpSec and Limitations against
Controls. [Her10, Ch.3, p.55]
The balanced equation is attained when each access has all ten, unlim-
ited controls since, as we noted above, “having all 10 controls for each pore
is functionally the same as closing the pore provided the controls have no lim-
itations” [Her10, Ch.4, p.67]. Thus, in any field, OSSTMM’s security goal is
achieved when no conceivable threat has any access to the asset under protection,
all pores are “functionally” closed. OSSTMM’s security is perfectly balanced
when all controls that OSSTMM can think of are in place without limitations,
i.e. when no degree of freedom exists beyond these totally encompassing con-
trols.20 In Data Network Security this approach may lead to “interactions within
a scope as well as complexity and maintenance issues” [Her10, Ch.1, p.22]. In
Human Security, it develops a whole different impact to be reckoned with.
4 Human Security
Recall that one of the key features of OSSTMM is that it employs one single secu-
rity testing methodology for all five channels identified in the document: Human
(Chapter 7), Physical (Chapter 8), Wireless (Chapter 9), Telecommunications
(Chapter 10), and Data Network Security (Chapter 11). Thus, it produces a
methodology that can, in principle, be applied to anything or anyone amongst
those irrespective of the object under consideration. To do this, the same 17
“Testing Modules”21 are employed for each of the five channels; meaning that
20 Note that this is a worst-case notion of security, in contrast to the average-case
notion used when applying the Trust Rules.
21 Posture Review, Logistics, Active Detection Verification, Visibility Audit, Access
Verification, Trust Verification, Controls Verification, Process Verification, Training
the methodology determines which aspects of each channel matter in security
terms. As a result, and as we highlight in the introduction, OSSTMM considers
itself a “holistic” methodology and has been recognised for its “comprehensive”
approach to security testing [Cre17]. Particularly its attention to Human Secu-
rity separates it from other methodologies (see Section 5.1).
OSSTMM’s treatment of trust gives a first account of how it conceptualises
human interactions. For example, in the hiring process of new employees, OS-
STMM suggests the following Trust Rule under the heading “Porosity”:
The number of employees living in the same community as the appli-
cant divided by the total number [of] people in the community. [Her10,
Ch.5, p.93]
An employee at age 50 with one prior conviction for fraud is the same security
liability (1/32) as an employee living in a town of 5,000 people together with 156
other employees. That is, an employee living in a small town with many other
employees of the same organisation is considered a possible “hole in [the] wall”,
i.e. a security threat. This might seem counter-intuitive, when starting from a
perspective of, say, social cohesion, but is consequential in OSSTMM’s logic.
These small-town employees have social relations with other employees outside
the control of the employer, i.e. they engage in processes outside the control of it.
In OSSTMM’s perspective on human agency and relations, they appear as po-
tential threats. It thus laments that social norms prevent the security enthusiast
from treating people accordingly:
Unfortunately, while using more controls works with objects and pro-
cesses, it may not work between people. Many times social norms con-
sider controls beyond simple authentication like matching a face or voice
with an identity to be offensive to the person to be trusted. Society often
requires us to be more trusting as individuals in order to benefit soci-
ety as a whole and sometimes at the expense of everyone’s individual
protection. [Her10, Ch.5, p.87]
When OSSTMM rhetorically takes the standpoint of the individual’s pro-
tection that is being undermined by “society as a whole”, it practically takes
the standpoint of an uninhibited authority against the individuals under its com-
mand. To this imagined authority any moment merely out of reach of surveillance
and control is to the detriment of an organisation’s security, which, we recall,
makes no reference to threats. Using the same example as above, OSSTMM
demonstrates this in another Trust Rule:
The number of hours per day the applicant will be working alone, unas-
sisted, unmonitored divided by the number of working hours. [Her10,
Ch.5, p.92]
Verification, Configuration Verification, Property Verification, Segregation Review,
Exposure Verification, Competitive Intelligence Scouting, Quarantine Verification,
Privileges Audit, Survivability Validation, and Alert and Log Review [Her10, Ch.6].
This view of human agency, as something that needs to be controlled, is
also evident throughout Chapter 7 on Human Security Testing. Here, OSSTMM
takes a more pro-active approach and, for example, suggests to test Trust as:
In Terrorem. Test and document the depth of requirements to incite fear,
revolt, violence, and chaos, through the disruption of personnel and the
use of rumor or other psychological abuse. [Her10, Ch.7, p.110]
How OSSTMM proposes to carry out these tests is unaccounted for. How it
can be done without breaking ethical guidelines and legal frameworks remains
unanswered.
OSSTMM’s proposition to target people through psychological means, in-
cluding “fear”, “rumor”, and “abuse” to test the level to which they can be
trusted is reminiscent of modern counterinsurgency operations, which, compared
with traditional military campaigns, rely as much on psychological means as on
physical action. A quick search through a few military counterinsurgency field
manuals and doctrines, such as [Arm09, AC10, MOD15], demonstrates these
similarities by identifying the need to influence individual perceptions through
“aggressive” information operations [AC10, p.152] aiming “to influence, disrupt,
corrupt, or usurp the decision making TAs [target audiences] to create a desired
effect to support achievement of an objective” [oD14, p.x].
This standpoint of requiring counterinsurgency-like techniques to test the
resilience of an organisation paired with a desire for total control over human
(inter)actions is no accident but the consequence of two of OSSTMM’s key tenets:
first, Human Security is treated identically to all other areas of security; humans
are treated as objects, just like computers, buildings and so on. Second, security
is defined without any regard to risk or threat.
While, as discussed above, perfect security is conceptualised as a balance of
operations and controls, this balance itself has no reference to any threat. Hence,
OSSTMM contains no notion of proportionality; whether a control measure is
justified in light of a threat or not cannot be determined given OSSTMM’s
rejection of threats altogether. To illustrate this consider the legal category of
proportionality first developed by High State Administrative Courts in Germany
to review actions of the police, i.e. the Security State [Hir81].22 It is part of
European Human Rights law under the European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR) and in UK Human Rights law it is interpreted as follows: “it is necessary
to determine (1) whether the objective of the measure is sufficiently important to
justify the limitation of a protected right, (2) whether the measure is rationally
connected to the objective, (3) whether a less intrusive measure could have been
used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective, and
(4) whether, balancing the severity of the measure’s effects on the rights of the
persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent
22 Also in military campaigns, from where OSSTMM appears to borrow some of its
language and approach, proportionality is a legal obligation and according to one
US Field Manual“requires that the advantage gained by a military operation not be
exceeded by the collateral harm” [AC10, p.247].
that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the
latter” [UKS13].
In contrast, OSSTMM, while referencing human rights as a consideration “to
assure a safe, high quality test” [Her10, Ch.7, p.105], is conceptually incapable
of “balancing the severity of the measure’s effects on [the rights of] the persons
to whom it applies against the importance of the objective”.23
OSSTMM does not see people as a strength in security terms but holds an
increasingly criticised view of humans in the security loop (see e.g. [PSF14]),
one where humans are always perceived as the “weakest link” rather than as
the subject of security. Instead, OSSTMM anticipates that people will “make
mistakes, forget tasks, and purposefully abandon tasks” [Her10, Ch.2, p.33],
and it aims to eradicate these “traits” by reducing the human to an object
whose interactions should be monitored, controlled and restricted. It does so
by developing a methodology that replaces the notion of people as subjects of
security with one where people are understood solely as objects of security. It
models human agency as a wild-card to be controlled:
Unfortunately, how we interact is just based on a collection of biases
we accumulate during life, which are subjected to the emotional or bio-
chemical state we are under when we have them. [Her10, Ch.14, p.204]
This position contradicts most writings in security studies which recognise the
human as a critical security actor, e.g. [BWDW98] and explored further below
in Section 5.1. The rejection of human agency is not only a problem in academic
terms. By not seeing the human as a key security actor, capable of doing the
securing, security itself is weakened. OSSTMM chooses to frame human agency
as a problem, rather than as a potential solution. This view does not stop with
those being tested. Indeed, OSSTMM’s suspicion of human agency also applies
to those doing the testing:
We are, after all, only human. Most often though our opinions are limited
and restricted to a small scope we know as “our little world”. We apply
them everywhere because they make life easier. But when we take them
with us and try to adhere them to larger, different, more complicated
series and types of interactions, we will likely make mistakes. What may
make perfect sense to us based on our experiences may not make any
sense at all outside of “our little world”. So what we need is a better,
less biased way of looking at the bigger, more dynamic, less personal,
world beyond ourselves. [Her10, Ch.14, p.204]
OSSTMM’s methodology for studying human security eliminates the human
from security: both in the form of the recognising subject – the tester – whose
verdicts it fundamentally distrusts as biased and replaces with a score with little
meaning, and in the form of recognised subjects – the tested – whose agency is
a “hole in [the] wall”. In OSSTMM’s view, the human mind is a security threat.
23 This is not a claim about OSSTMM’s legality but ought to explain that its heavy-
handed approach to human security is a logical consequence of its conception of
security.
5 Discussion
We have reviewed OSSTMM’s main contributions to the field of security testing.
In Section 2, we observed that OSSTMM commits a type error by treating
categorical values that are specific to different domains as ordinal values that
apply across a wide range of domains. As a consequence it presents a security
score using homographs and unmotivated choices which has little relation to
the object being measured. In Section 3, we observed that OSSTMM’s notion
of Trust confuses and identifies different notions of trust, producing nonsensical
claims. This lack of clarity serves to create a unified Trust score to replace
considerations of risk and threats, producing a notion of security that is internal
to the object being studied, independent of attacker goals or capabilities. Finally,
in Section 4, we criticised the effects of OSSTMM’s approach to identify Human
Security with other areas of security, disregarding the subjectivity of the objects
under consideration. This produces an approach to security testing that alienates
those who are relied on to do the securing, which ultimately weakens security
itself.
In summary, we found none of OSSTMM’s key contributions to survive under
scrutiny and that the flaws identified in OSSTMM render it incorrect. These
flaws, however, are an artefact of OSSTMM’s ambition to be “scientific”, which
it characterises as “not [being] about believing or relying on your experience, no
matter how vast, but on knowing facts we can build upon” [Her10, Ch.3, p.53].
In OSSTMM’s view this means quantifying its data.24 As we have shown, to
square this circle OSSTMM has to rely on unmotivated choices and assertions
throughout. OSSTMM does not provide justification or evidence to ground its
methodology, rendering it unscientific on its own terms. We conclude that the
serious flaws identified in our analysis make the methodology futile. Thus, we
suggest that security professionals abandon the use of OSSTMM as a guide to
security testing.
Remark 2. It might be objected that OSSTMM has utility despite the flaws iden-
tified in this work. Indeed, in addition to its conceptualisation of security, it – like
any other security testing guideline – also does advise a security tester to scan,
say, port 80 on each host in a network using a TCP SYN scan, which is sound
advice. We remark, however, that the flaws we identified invalidate OSSTMM’s
key concepts, as expressed by ISECOM itself and others, i.e. OSSTMM in its
own right. Put differently, removing what makes OSSTMM OSSTMM from OS-
STMM might result in a functional, albeit by now somewhat outdated, security
testing checklist.
5.1 Related Work
OSSTMM’s claim that it is a “holistic” security testing methodology that covers
both technological and human security, with a scoring system that captures trust
24 “It appears that we are capable to rationalize in a way to supersede how we feel about
trusting a target. This means we can quantify it by applying a logical process” [Her10,
Ch.5, p.87]
as well as access and visibility, necessitates engagement with a diverse set of
literatures and bodies of work.
Security Metrics. A growing number of works focus on the use of security met-
rics and the benefits of such metrics to organisations, e.g. [KH06, Pay06, Jaq07,
Hay10, BH11, Bra14, Cam14], while only a small body of writings offers criti-
cal reflections on such claims and on the wide use of metrics to satisfy security
assessments. For example, in an overview of security metrics Ahmed [Ahm16,
p.108] writes: “They [security metrics] do not provide any help in measuring or
monitoring the effectiveness of controls. Instead they measure the existence of
controls”. Moreover, Kaur and Jones [KJ08, p.45] note the tension embedded in
security metrics: “It is difficult to have one metrics [sic.] that covers all types of
devices. To be effective the level of detail and granularity needed is high. How-
ever, to have a large scope and cover all manner of devices requires a general
metrics [sic.] which will not meet all security challenges”. Recently, CERT/CC
published a critique of the widely used Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) [SHH+18] where the authors note the data type error committed by
CVSS by treating ordinal values as interval values, the difficulty of assigning
a single score irrespective of differing requirements and suggest “the way to fix
this problem is to skip converting qualitative measurements to numbers”. Hence,
while security metrics and standardised forms of assessing the robustness of an
organisation’s security posture are widely used and generally accepted, some
criticisms, albeit a small selection, do exist.
Metrics. Beyond information security, the pitfalls of translating qualitative
statements into quantities (which may then be algebraically manipulated) are
a subject of active debate in the social, psychological and clinical sciences, see
e.g. [KUM96, PS13] and the references therein. These discussions testify to the
need for critical engagement with the methods of evaluation before offering con-
clusive findings. This is also evident in economics, where e.g. Kay criticises the
“modern curse of bogus quantification” [Kay11] and points out that the “index
[. . . ] is not telling us anything we have not already told the index [. . . ]” [Kay09].
Such critiques thus warn against relying on metrics for a complete understanding
of the objects under evaluation.
Trust. Measuring trust is a key component of OSSTMM. Yet, as evidenced in
our critique and exemplified by a broad range of literature, trust is not a mono-
lithic concept. It carries multiple meanings depending on perspective, purpose
and disciplinary grounding. Within the social and behavioural sciences, disci-
plines such as sociology, (social) psychology and behavioural economics disagree
on trust definitions and methodological approaches, see e.g. [BNH10, Coo05,
CLH09, Kra99, RS08, Har04, Har13], which in turn differ from notions of trust
in computer science, e.g. [BFL96, LN10, GW11]. A common understanding of
trust does therefore not exist. This is epitomised by Mollering [Mol06] when
outlining three schools of thought on trust: trust as reason, trust as routine and
trust as reflexive. More specifically, for (social) psychologists, e.g. [BV04, DF11],
the notion of trust as a rational choice – as a decision – dominates, whilst be-
havioural economic understandings of trust focus on averting negative outcomes
of opportunism and to limit the risk of exploitation [Lin00, Tul08]. These posi-
tions rely heavily on individualistic and psychological positions put forward by
experimental and quantitative researchers, and they contrast with the notion of
trust as a “sociological reality” where “[t]rust in everyday life is a mix of feelings
and rational thinking” [LW85]. While sociology defines trust in relation to social
processes and relations, behavioural notions of trust founded in psychology or
behavioural economics take an individualistic approach.
While some seminal writings have placed trust at the centre of sociologi-
cal theorising [Luh79, Bar83], most computer security perspectives on humans
largely ignore this branch of trust research – trust as a social construction –
and, instead, conceptualise trust in line with psychology and behavioural eco-
nomics [LN10, BFL96, Col09] as their primary aim is usability, e.g. [BCL15,
CJL+13, KOB+08, RSM03, RSM05, RSM07, Tad10]. This therefore also leads
to a reductive and individualistic view of trust, and the mistaken assumption
that trust and trusted in computer science carry the same meaning as in the
social sciences. For example, Camp et al. [CNM01, p.96] note: “trusted in the
social sciences has exactly the same meaning of trusted in computer science
[. . . ] that which is trusted is trusted exactly because if it fails there is a loss”.
This not only assumes a common understanding of “trusted” in social and com-
puter science, but also within the social sciences themselves; an assumption that
is invalidated by the works cited above. From this non-exhaustive, yet, multi-
perspective discussion on trust, it is evident that no single definition exists and
that each distinct definition of trust serves its own specific purpose.
Human Agency. As we have seen, applying its security tests to humans is
a key aspect of OSSTMM; an aspect that also distinguishes it from other se-
curity testing methodologies, see e.g. [PR10]. Critically, however, humans have
agency which means that they have the capacity to act independently or col-
lectively upon their environment, to influence their surroundings and to make
choices. The notion of human agency has also received increased attention in
scholarly writings pertaining to organisational consequences of technological ad-
vancements, e.g. [FP03, SO04, BR05]. In this body of literature, the notion of an
“agentic turn” describes the increased agency of actors in relation to the organi-
sation. From this perspective, security processes and technologies are shaped as
much by the humans that use them as by their material objects.
However, Pfleeger and Caputo [PC12] note that while a key aspect of im-
proving information security involves understanding human behaviour, most ef-
forts “focus primarily on incorporating new technological approaches in products
and processes”. Similarly, Sasse and Flechais [SF05] argue that a secure system
is a sociotechnical system based on an understanding of human behaviours to
“prevent users from being the ‘weakest link’ ”. This is a view that was already
cemented in Adams and Sasse’s seminal work. It showed that a lack of un-
derstanding of users resulted in an absence of user-centred design in security
mechanisms [AS99], which led users to both intentionally and unintentionally
circumvent such mechanisms (see also later work, e.g. [CJL+13, FC12, Wol17]).
Such writings evidence the critical need to recognise and understand human
agency in security terms, rather than treating humans as passive objects that
need security to be done to them.
Security Testing Methodologies. OSSTMM is one of a handful of established
penetration testing methodologies, standards and guidances such as [RBD+06,
SSCO08, Cou15, NKR+12, MM14]. Most of these documents focus on tech-
nical steps to be carried out by the tester [RBD+06, MM14], while some fo-
cus more on pre- and post-engagement [Cou15] or provide a combination of
both [NKR+12]. Besides OSSTMM no methodology lays any claim to being sci-
entific or attempts to capture such a broad range of areas in which security could
be considered.25 Indeed, typically these methodologies focus on network- and in-
frastructure penetration testing, while specialised methodologies for web appli-
cations exist [MM14], i.e. the focus in other documents is considerably narrower
than in OSSTMM. These methodologies are largely compatible by exhibiting a
significant level of similarity in suggesting variants of a stepped discovery, enu-
meration and exploitation approach. It is worth noting, however, that regardless
of this similarity some methodologies are incompatible. For example, the popular
Penetration Testing Execution Standard [NKR+12] and OSSTMM are incom-
patible. The former prominently features threat modelling, whereas the latter
insists on disregarding threats.
Academic treatments of OSSTMM or penetration testing methodologies as
objects of study only come in the form of comparisons of various methodologies,
either in the preliminaries of academic works to justify their particular choice of
methodology or as publications in their own right, e.g. [Sha14, SJ15, KCSK15].
However, these comparisons restrict their attention to high-level features, such
as the level of detail or what is and is not covered, as well as the genealogies of
the different versions. To our knowledge, prior to this work no work existed in
the literature that conceptually examines penetration testing methodologies on
whether they deliver on what they promise.
5.2 Future Work
This work provokes the question of whether broader lessons can be drawn from
it. While OSSTMM might be unsuitable for interrogating security, do its failings
point to broader issues that should be addressed?
25 “Therefore, with version 3, the OSSTMM encompasses tests from all channels – Hu-
man, Physical, Wireless, Telecommunications, and Data Networks. This also makes
it a perfectly suited for testing cloud computing, virtual infrastructures, messaging
middleware, mobile communication infrastructures, high-security locations, human
resources, trusted computing, and any logical processes which all cover multiple
channels and require a different kind of security test.” [Her10, Introduction, p.11]
On the one hand, other standard security testing methodologies, such as
PTES [NKR+12] or OWASP [MM14], avoid many of the issues which we criticise
in this work. They do not define scores, they do not posit new notions of trust
and they do not focus on human and social aspects of security. On the other
hand, some of the issues we highlight in OSSTMM are more general.
Scores. While OSSTMM expresses the methodological dogma that scientific
knowledge equals quantification particularly crudely this is not its privilege.26
Rather, this conviction is common across information security, as exemplified,
for example, in CVSS which claims to score security vulnerabilities by a sin-
gle magnitude. Moreover, the somewhat bad reputation of security testing as a
“tickbox exercise” speaks of the same limitation: counting rather than under-
standing. Echoing the critique of CVSS in [SHH+18], we thus suggest, too, that
security professionals “skip converting qualitative measurements to numbers”.
The healthy debates in other disciplines (see Section 5.1) provide material for
a debate within information security to examine the correctness and utility of
assigning numerical values to various pieces of data.
Social. A mistake we criticise in OSSTMM is the failure to recognise that the
moments of a social organisation are different from the moments of a computer
network. This, too, is no privilege of OSSTMM as can be easily verified by the
prevalence of mantras along the lines of “humans/people/users are the weakest
link”. This standpoint, which is as prevalent as it is wrong [AS99, PSF14], offers
the curious indictment that people fail to integrate into a piece of technology that
does not work for them. In the context of security testing this standpoint has a
home under the heading of “social engineering” and its most visible expression:
routine but ineffective phishing simulations [KS12]. It is worth noting, though,
that even when the focus is exclusively on technology, not engaging with the
social relations that this technology ought to serve may produce undesirable
results, for example leading to designs of technological controls with draconian
effects where less invasive means would have been adequate [DG10].
More broadly, the tendency of information security to rely on psychology,
dominated by individualistic and behavioural perspectives and quantitative ap-
proaches to understanding social and human aspects of security [BCL15, CJL+13,
FC12], may represent an obstacle. Alternative methodological approaches from
the social sciences, particularly from sociology and even anthropology, such as
semi-structured interviews, participant-led focus groups and ethnography offer
promising avenues to deeply understand the security practices and needs in an
organisation, see e.g. [GRF15].
26 Perhaps the most prominent quote in this spirit is attributed to Lord Kelvin: “When
you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know
something about it; when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in
numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the
beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the
stage of science.”
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A A Synthetic Toy Example
In the following, we symbolically work through OSSTMM’s calculation [Her10,
Section 4.4] of the rav using a synthetic toy example of one host in a network
providing a remote login service. To keep expressions compact we also do not
model all the accesses, trusts and controls typically found in such a scenario.
OSSTMM starts from the scope’s Visibility PV , Access PA and Trust PT . In our
case, one host is visible PV = 1h which responds on one port PA = 1p (and on
the IP layer, which we do not model here). In the interest of compactness, we
will also assume PT = 0. OSSTMM defines Operational Security as OpSecsum =
PV + PA + PT = 1h + 1p. From this, OSSTMM computes the the Operational
Security base value
OpSecbase = log
2 (1 + 100h+ 100p) .
Considering a logarithm is motivated in [Her10, Section 1.5] and [Her10, Sec-
tion 4.1] but the particular choice of log2(·) is not motivated, the additive factor 1
is motivated to obtain zero in case of no attack surface. OSSTMM defines control
meta classes A = {Au, Id,Re, Su, Ct} and B = {NR, It, Pr, Cf,Al}, see Sec-
tion 2. We assume only authentication LCAu is enforced via a login LCAu = 1ℓ.
In OSSTMM’s terms the sum of loss controls in this example is thus
LCsum
∑
λ∈A∪B
LCλ = 1ℓ.
Let λ ∈ A ∪ B be any control type. Then, OSSTMM further defines Missing
Controls as
MCλ = max (OpSecsum − LCλ, 0)
and the sum of these missing controls as MCsum =
∑
λ∈A∪B MCλ. True Con-
trols are then defined as
TCλ = OpSecsum − TCλ = OpSecsum −max (OpSecsum − LCλ, 0)
= min (LCλ, OpSecsum)
In our case, we would have to decide if 1h + 1p > 1ℓ, i.e. if one active host
added to one port is greater than a login being applied. OSSTMM considers all
formal variables as equal to the integer 1, suggesting the inequality does not hold
in OSSTMM’s model. The idea of this check is you cannot miss less than zero
controls. OSSTMM does not motivate why controls are not normalised by 1/10
here in contrast to other formulas. Following along, we obtain the True Controls
base TCbase and the Full Controls base FCbase:
TCbase = log
2 (1 + 100× (OpSecsum −MCsum/10))
= log2 (10ℓ+ 1)
= log2 (1 + 10× LCsum)
= FCbase
SecLimsum = (LV × (OpSecsum + MCsum)/OpSecsum) + (LW × (OpSecsum + MCA)/OpSecsum)
+ (LC × (OpSecsum + MCB)/OpSecsum)
+ (LE × ((PV + PA) × MCvg + LV + LW + LC)/OpSecsum)
+ (LA × (PT × MCvg + LV + LW + LC)/OpSecsum)
=
(11h − ℓ + 11 p)2
(h + p)2
+
(
10h − ℓ + 10 p +
10 (11h−ℓ+11 p)
h+p
+
10 (6h−ℓ+6 p)
h+p
+ 60
)2
100 (h + p)2
+
(6h − ℓ + 6 p)2
(h + p)2
+
(
11 h−ℓ+11 p
h+p
+
6h−ℓ+6 p
h+p
+ 6
)2
(h + p)2
+ 36
Fig. 1. Security Limitations
These expressions are then combined into various Limitations Formula encod-
ing vulnerabilities LV , weaknesses LW , concerns LC , exposures LE , anomalies
LA which are then combined to obtain the Security Limitations sum as given
Figure 1 where MCvg = MCsum/(10 × OpSecsum). As before, SecLimbase is
defined as log2(1 + 100× SecLimsum). Finally, Actual Security, the “true state
of security as a hash of all three sections” [Her10, p.85] is defined as
ActSec = 100 + FCbase −OpSecbase − log(1 + 100× SecLimsum)
− 1/100×OpSecbase × (FCbase − log(1 + 100× SecLimsum))
+ 1/100× FCbase × log(1 + 100× SecLimsum).
Expanding this formula for our toy example produces Figure 2. To compute the
numerical rav value OSSTMM evaluates this expression at one for all formal
variables. In our example, this gives a value of ≈ −12. The reader is invited to
compare information provided by the symbolic or numerical Actual Security to
the information provided by our initial informal description of the toy example.
We stress that while the methodology, for example, forces the analyst to recognise
that our login service provides no confidentiality (LCCf = 0 in OSSTMM terms),
this does not distinguish OSSTMM from other security testing methodologies.
Rather, OSSTMM’s key procedure is the rav computation producing Figure 2.
ActSec = log


19401 h4
h4 + 4 h3p + 6 h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
−
3420 h3ℓ
h4 + 4h3p + 6 h2p2 + 4hp3 + p4
+
201 h2ℓ2
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
77604 h3p
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
−
10260 h2ℓp
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
402 hℓ2p
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
116406 h2p2
h4 + 4h3p + 6h2p2 + 4hp3 + p4
−
10260 hℓp2
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
201 ℓ2p2
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
77604 hp3
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
−
3420 ℓp3
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
19401 p4
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
4600 h3
h4 + 4h3p + 6h2p2 + 4hp3 + p4
−
860 h2ℓ
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
40 hℓ2
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
13800 h2p
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
−
1720 hℓp
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
40 ℓ2p
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
13800 hp2
h4 + 4h3p + 6h2p2 + 4hp3 + p4
−
860 ℓp2
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
4600 p3
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
105800 h2
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
−
18400 hℓ
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
800 ℓ2
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
211600 hp
h4 + 4h3p + 6h2p2 + 4hp3 + p4
−
18400 ℓp
h4 + 4 h3p + 6h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4
+
105800 p2
h4 + 4 h3p + 6 h2p2 + 4 hp3 + p4


2
·
( 1
100
log (100h + 100 p + 1)2 −
1
100
log (10 ℓ + 1)2 − 1
)
−
1
100
(
log (10 ℓ + 1)
2
+ 100
)
log (100 h + 100 p + 1)
2
+ log (10 ℓ + 1)
2
+ 100
Fig. 2. Actual Security
